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1.1 Theme and research question 
I will in this thesis study the regulation of overseas non-governmental organizations’ 
(hereafter ONGOs) activities in China1. January 1st 2017 the “Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on Administration, of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations, in the 
Mainland of China” (hereafter the ONGO law) took effect, and was the first of its kind to 
regulate ONGOs in China. Throughout this thesis I will analyze the law, and also look at if 
and how the law applies to and shapes its society. The question I will try to answer is: What is 
the legal situation for ONGOs in China under the new law? This question will bring me into 
an analysis of the rule of law, and whether or not it applies to the ONGO legal area.  
China is an authoritarian regime and has recently enacted strict regulation of ONGO’s activity 
in the country. This creates special challenges for the ONGOs operating there, as well as for 
foreigners who want to understand how the regulation functions. ONGOs have been present 
in China since the early 80’s and have since the 1990’s grown in numbers. In 2016, Fu Ying, 
former vice foreign minister of China, suggested that there are more than 7000 ONGOs in 
China2. However, up until recently there has not been a cohesive law regulating these 
organizations. Up until the new law took effect, some ONGOs registered with the authorities 
as businesses, charities or foundations, while others just flew under the radar.  
In April 2016 the Chinese government passed a new law on overseas non-governmental 
organizations, which would regulate the registrations, operations and legal status of the 
ONGOs in China3. China is not the only country that has enacted restrictions on NGOs. Since 
2010 more than 60 countries has drafted or passed laws that curtail the activity of non-
governmental and civil society organizations. 96 countries have taken steps to inhibit NGOs 
from operating at full capacity, under which international aid groups and their local partners 
are vilified, harassed, closed down, and sometimes expelled4. The new Chinese law enables 
organizations to achieve a clearer legal status, but it is also a new legal element to the 
                                                
1 “Overseas” is considered to be any territory outside of Mainland China, including Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan. See the Chapter 3 for further disclosure on the term “ONGO”.  
2 Wu 2017 
3 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administration, of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental 
2 Wu 2017 
3 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administration, of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental 
Organizations 





ONGOs’ already established perception of their legal situation. In this thesis I will discuss 
and analyze the legal situation for ONGOs in China. 
In order to explore this, the thesis will examine a narrower area of the Chinese legal system, 
in the hope that it will give the reader more insight into just how complex even the smaller 
pieces of the system are. I will also try to draw some conclusions about the rule of law in this 
particular area, but in consideration of the thoughts presented above, there will be less 
emphasis on this effort compared to the thesis's main goal, which is to give an example to 
how Chinese law could be approached in order to give an accurate picture of how the system's 
logic and dynamics actually are perceived on the ground. I have therefore conducted around a 
dozen interviews with ONGOs and experts in Beijing about their interpretation of their legal 
situation, and how that interplays with their risk assessment of legal sanctions and extralegal 
sanctions, as well as their operational strategies for reaching their organization's goals. The 
interviews were conducted in March/April 2017, shortly after the ONGO law took effect.  
 
2. Method and sources 
2.1 Accessibility of sources  
With digitalization, sources of Chinese law have become more available than ever before. 
However, it is not just the mere access that has been an obstacle for foreigners who try to 
study the Chinese law system, also language has been a barrier for many. With China opening 
up to the West, more and more laws and legal documents have been translated into English. In 
this paper I’m using the official English translation of the ONGO law, provided by the 
Ministry of Public Security5. By using the official translation I try to limit the inaccuracies 
and misinterpretation that might arise in translation. However, it must be noted that the 
Chinese text prevails in the event of inconsistency, and that the risk of misinterpretation is 
still present even when the translation comes from an official source. 
To discuss and analyze the legal situation for ONGOs in China I would argue that it is simply 
not sufficient to only examine the law in a narrow sense because this does not fully reflect the 
actual situation for the participants in this legal system. The law exists in an authoritarian 
                                                




legal environment where the legal subjects, the ONGOs, are also acting and reacting in 
relation to a set of state sanctioned unwritten norms, so only examining the law would be like 
only seeing one half of the playing field of a football match.  
In the authoritarian context of China, the laws are also intentionally made unclear and vague, 
and are therefore hard to interpret for an outside student. Conducting fieldwork has facilitated 
the opportunity to fact check governmental information, consult multiple sources, and go 
directly to the ONGOs as primary sources. This benefits overcoming the possible biases that 
secondary literature may contain6. Having multiple and different sources also enhances the 
reliability of the study.  
Because the civil society in China is growing and changing rapidly, many books and articles 
are already out of date. Because the new ONGO law is so new, there are not many studies 
available on this topic. Even though doing fieldwork for a master thesis of law is not the most 
common, it has been crucial for me. To be able to make a snapshot of the current situation, I 
had to get fresh updated information from the ONGOs at this point in time. I also hope that 
the findings will be valuable for further studies on the legal aspects of the civil society in 
China.  
 
2.2. Selection and interview techniques 
The subjects for the interviews was found by using multiple sources: Internet sources, 
contacts from other scholars and experts, and having sources name other sources. A problem 
with seeking sources with other sources is that the subjects might suggest interview subjects 
that have the same point of view as they have. Therefore, a combination of the different 
method for selection was preferred. 
The interviews were semi-structural in the sense that the questions mainly followed an 
interview guide prepared in advance (See Appendix 1). During the interview I asked follow 
up questions, and the order of the questions was changed from interview to interview, 
according to what questions felt most natural at the time. By having an interview guide I 
made sure that all topics were covered. This is important so that all the interviews, and the 
NGOs, could be analyzed in comparison to each other, according to the same topic.  
                                                





All the interviews were conducted in English. With each person I made an evaluation of 
whether an interpreter was needed or not. By my evaluation, all the people interviewed had 
high enough English language skills to express themselves sufficiently. However, as English, 
for some, was not their main language, some meanings or interpretations might have been lost 
in translation. With that said, by talking directly to the people I interviewed I was able to 
connect with the person interviewed and build trust. This would have been harder with an 
interpreter present. 
Interviewing people active in the Chinese civil society about their relationship to the 
government is not without conflict or concerns. When asked, some of the people interviewed 
were not comfortable with having their, or their organization’s name in this thesis. In order to 
make the interview subjects able to answer more openly, without being afraid of possible 
consequences, I decided to anonymize all interviews. Having anonymous sources in a study 
weakens the reliability of the findings, as the reader is not able to crosscheck the information 
presented by the anonymous sources without seeking me, the author, for the sources. The 
transcription of the interviews and information of the subjects interviewed has therefore been 
handled with great caution, as some of the topics that where covered are indeed sensitive. The 
respondent will in the thesis be referred to as Subject A, B, C and so on. At the time the 
interviews were conducted, the law was a very new element. Although the law had taken 
effect, the situation might have changed since then. Hopefully the interviews can serve to give 
a snapshot into a time of the implementation of a new law in China, and a larger perspective 
on a legal area in change. 
 
3. What is an ONGO? 
Although I have already used the term “non-governmental organization”, I will need to give a 
more expansive explanation on this term, and how it will be used in this thesis. The definition 
in the thesis differs from the legal definition in the ONGO law, which will be discussed 
further in Chapter 5. First of all, Western scholars are divided on the definition of NGOs, 
second, the term “non-governmental organization” does not have a direct translation into the 
Chinese language, third, there are some complexity to how a western theoretical definition 
could be applied to the authoritarian context of the Chinese civil society, and fourth, the 
ONGO law’s definition is also operational with regards to jurisdiction. This thesis will 
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therefore not only have to present nuances in definitions raised by scholars and explain which 
definition this thesis will be using, but also discuss how the chosen definition will need to be 
adapted to an authoritarian context, as well as shed light on the Chinese interpretation in order 
to give context to the legal definition and the reasoning behind it. 
 
3.1 What is a NGO? 
This thesis will use Salamon and colleagues’ (1999, 4) definition of non-governmental 
organizations, where NGOs are understood as organizations that have an institutional 
presence and structure; institutionally separate from the state; who do not return their profits 
to their managers or to a set of “owners”; fundamentally in control of their own affairs; and 
last, that membership in them is not legally required and they attract some level of voluntary 
contribution of time or money. NGOs are further a part of the greater «civil society», 
understood as a separate sphere outside the boundaries of the market and the state7. Salamon 
and colleagues writes that in a Western notion, non-governmental organizations are formal, 
private, and non-profit-distributing, but they are also self-governing and voluntary8.  
Others, like Hasenfeld and Gidron (2005, 10) further distinguish between organizations that 
seek to reform or transform. While transforming organizations is characterized as opposing to 
the state regimes and seek to replace them with alternative regimes, reforming organizations, 
in contrast, seek to alter the state regime’s policies. The literature on Chinese civil society, 
against the backdrop of the 1989 democracy movement, focused on the areas of conflict 
between civil society and democratization of the state9. In this way the civil society, and 
NGOs, have been viewed as a counter to the Chinese Communist Party, thus as transforming 
organizations.  
This interpretation, in my opinion, does not fully reflect the complexity of the Chinese civil 
society, as many of the NGOs, both foreign and domestic, has chosen strategies of different 
levels of cooperation with the Chinese regime. Although some NGOs might have an ultimate 
goal of transforming the Chinese regime, most of them seem to realize that the space for 
opposition to the regime makes it too hard to operate without any form of collaboration or 
                                                
7 Salamon et al. 1999 
8 Salamon and Anheier 17 1992, 134 





compliance with the government. To characterize most NGOs, domestic or otherwise, as 
transforming organizations would therefore be a too large simplification.  
 
3.2 NGOs in the Chinese context 
Not only the authoritarian context, but also the history of civil society in China makes the 
entire concept of NGOs a bit alien to China. The Chinese government refers to a whole range 
of domestic non-profit organizations as “social organizations” (shehuozuzhi), comparable to 
NGOs in the West. Categories used by the government to register these organizations vary, 
but none of them accurately corresponds to the term “non-governmental organization”10. 
Also, the regulation and operation of NGOs, both domestic and foreign, are quite complex. In 
order to register as a non-governmental organization, you’ll need a Chinese bureau or a quasi-
governmental agency as your “professional supervisory unit” (PSU) or “Chinese Partner”11. 
The list of approved PSUs (referred to as the Catalogue) mostly contain different agencies of 
municipalities, administration, commissions and bureaus12. Also Chinese NGOs, in order to 
register as a legal domestic NGO, need a form of governmentally organized non-
governmental organization (GONGO) as sponsor. Because of this some scholars question the 
autonomy and legitimacy of the Chinese NGOs, since the NGO will not be completely 
without governmental ties. According to Foster (2001, 85) co-opted NGOs are not functional 
in the civil society as they are not independent and therefore used as tools of the authoritarian 
states for domination of civil society. This idea has led some scholars, such as Feng (2017) to 
conclude that in strict legal terms, there are no legal domestic NGOs in China. They are either 
legal but not an NGO, or an NGO but not legal. However, how the PSUs function in practice, 
and the ties with the NGOs, vary in form and strength from organization to organization. 
Therefore, I would argue that it is too simplifying to say that Chinese NGOs are either 
governmental, non-governmental, reformative or transformative.  
In light of this discussion, a NGO in this thesis will therefore be understood as an 
organization that have an institutional presence and structure, which are not run by the state or 
any governmental level. However, I would not be as strict on whether the NGOs have a link 
                                                
10 For list of different NGO categories in China, see i.e. Feng 2017 
11 Pittman 2017 




to any governmental agency, as this is required in order to register as a legal NGO or ONGO 
in China.  
It is specified in the first and second article of The ONGO Law that the law concerns 
“nongovernmental organizations from outside China’s mainland”, and that “Overseas NGOs,” 
is referred to in this Law as “foundations, social groups, think tanks and other non-profit, non-
governmental social organizations legally established overseas”. The definition in the legal 
text does not reflect any prerequisites for qualifying to be an NGO, but rather lists examples 
of what type of organizations that could be considered an NGO. The legal implications of this 
will be discussed later. On the terminological side, not much can be inferred from the law’s 
definition at face value. The thesis will therefore, in using the definition described above, err 
on the side of inclusion when it comes to what could be considered an NGO or not.  
The ONGO-law uses the term “overseas NGO” instead of “foreign NGOs” (FNGO). The law 
specifies that “overseas NGO” also cover NGOs from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan13. This 
has in turn affected how the international civil society community in China uses the term 
“foreign NGO” and “international NGO” (INGO), which is largely equated to have the same 
meaning as “overseas NGO”. These three terms were used interchangeably during the 
interviews that were conducted for this thesis. The thesis itself will exclusively use “overseas 
NGO” for consistency, and because it seems to be the most precise alternative.  
 
4. Theoretical Background 
4.1 The Chinese legal system 
4.1.1 The Chinese political, legal and judicial system  
China is often described as a non-democratic, authoritarian regime, or high-capacity non-
democratic regime14. The foundation of the political system of China is a one party system 
where the Chinese Communist Party is the only party in power. Unlike the separation of 
powers in the western countries, China centralizes the state power into the National People’s 
Congress (NPC), which not only enacts legislation but also appoints and supervises 
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administrators and the judiciary15. As the permanent organ of the NPC, the Standing 
Committee is endowed with extensive legislative and supervisory rights under the 
constitution16. The NPC exercise the state power of amending the Constitution and 
supervising the enforcement of the Constitution, enacts basic laws of the state, as well as 
elects and decides on the choices of the leading personnel of the highest state organs of China. 
This includes among others electing the President of the Supreme People’s Court and the 
Procurator-General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate17. Even though China is not 
completely comparable to the western module of separation of powers, the Chinese 
government is divided into different bodies of function. While NPC is the highest organ of 
state power, the State Council is the executive body and the highest organ of state 
administration, the people’s procuratorates is the state organ for legal supervision and the 
people’s courts are the juridical organs of the state.   
The Chinese legal system is a socialist system of law based primarily on the Civil Law legal 
system18. When the reforms started in the late 1970s, the legal system was effectively at zero. 
Saich (2011, p 161-162) goes far in saying that the Chinese legal system “is simply one 
specific crog in a bureaucratic machine that is build to achieve state objectives”. After more 
than three decades of continuous work on the rule of law, China now exercises uniform yet 
multi-tiered legislation. This means that they emphasize that legal authority runs from the 
statues rather than judgments. The statutory hierarchy of the Chinese legal system runs from 
the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China of 1982, via laws, regulations, provisions, 
rules, detailed rules, measures, decisions, resolutions and orders19. Some of these are national, 
and some are local.  
China has a four-tiered court system: the Supreme People’s Court at the center, the Higher 
People’s Courts at the provincial level, the Intermediate People’s Court at the municipality 
level and the Basic People’s Courts at counties or city districts level. The Basic People’s 
courts have tribunals at the local level, such as in towns, municipalities and autonomous 
communities. The Supreme People’s Court can review the decisions of all lower courts and 
has jurisdiction over all regular and special courts. Chinese courts at all levels have a juridical 
committee as the highest judicial organ in a court. Members of the juridical committees, at 
                                                
15 Jiang 2017, p 344 
16 Jiang 2017 p 321-322 
17 Jiang 2017, p 318 
18 Jiang 2017, p 321 
19 Jiang 2017, p 330 
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various levels, are appointed and removed by the standing committee of the People’s congress 
at the corresponding level20. As in other civil law countries, China has a procuratorates system 
that parallels the court system, but is independent from both the courts and the Ministry of 
Justice, and is responsible for the supervision of the juridical system21. In China, the 
procuratorate is an active player in the adjudication system, and the procuratorates exercise 
the power of prosecution. In this sense China’s procuratorate is unique compared to western 
equivalents, since it has a dual role in the criminal process, undertaking both prosecution and 
adjudicative supervision22. The Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate bear the authority to issue nationally enforceable Juridical Interpretations as 
guidelines to the trials. The interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court are more 
voluminous, comprehensive and pervasive, and therefore constitutes a significant part in the 
hierarchy of Chinese law23.  
 
4.1.2 Can the concept of Rule of Law be applied to China? 
This brings us back to a central point in relation to the Chinese legal system: What is 
considered “legal”? Any legal scholar who tries to analyze the Chinese legal system have to 
answer this question in order to be able to actually describe what is going on in China. Some 
frame this debate by using the concept of "rule of law". There are many definitions and 
interpretations to such a contested concept, but at its most basic, “rule of law” refers to a 
system in which law is able to impose meaningful restraints on the state and individual 
members of the ruling elite, as captured in the rhetorically powerful, if overly simplistic, 
notions of a government of laws, the supremacy of the law, and equality of all before the 
law24. Some scholars, such as Horsley goes a bit further when he defines it as “a system under 
which law acts as a curb on state and private power. Rules are set in advance and applied 
consistently, equally and transparently by independent courts that serve as a backstop to 
protect civil, political, and human rights”25. This view of the legal system as a part of a 
democratic society has led many Western scholars to become skeptical about the claim of rule 
of law in China, and some, such as Jiang (2017, p 344) conclude that “a systematic approach, 
                                                
20 Jiang 2017, p 325-326 
21 Jiang 2017, p 326 
22 Jiang 2017, p 326 
23 Jiang 2017, p 331 
24 Peerenboom 2002, p 2 





to comprehensively promote the rule of law is also a far-reaching and profound revolution”. 
Also Horsley (2006, 93), conclude that “China does not much resemble a “rule of law” 
society”. In similar ways, other scholars advises that one have to recognize the limitation of 
the rule of law model that Westerners hold up as a universal standards because it has failed to 
guarantee social justice26.  
Finding a common vocabulary for analyzing Chinese law might be useful, however the 
problems arise when trying to nail down a label that fits the entire Chinese legal system. 
Some areas are more governed by law than others. Some parts might rather be governed by 
factors like politics, clientelism, and connections (guanxi), which does not fit the 
understanding of rule of law. Connections and politics affect some, but not all factors. An 
analysis of constitutional law might come up with an entirely different answer than an 
analysis of economic regulations. It is therefore a very difficult task to build a theoretical 
framework that allows for labeling the entire Chinese legal system as more or less based on 
rule of law.  
In his book "China's long march toward rule of law" (2002), Randall Peerenboom provide a 
more nuanced view on the Chinese legal system and its relation to rule of law than many of 
his predecessors. However, as he himself mentions in his book, it is difficult to do an 
objective analysis without letting normative opinions about which factors to emphasize 
influence the scholar in their conclusions. Although this observation might seem to devalue 
attempts to draw conclusions about the Chinese legal system's relationship to rule of law, my 
opinion is that such an effort is not entirely futile as long as the scholar also tries to disclose 
the reasoning behind their choice of emphasis. Having this in mind, Peerenboom divides the 
theories of rule of law in to types: a "thin" and a "thick" interpretation of rule of law.  
A "thin" theory of rule of law is understood as the minimum criteria for defining a state as 
based on rule of law: That any legal system must possess to function effectively as a system 
of laws, regardless of whether the legal system is a part of a democratic society or not. In this 
sense laws should be general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being followed, 
stable and enforced. On the other hand the "thick" understanding of rule of law, adds to the 
thin understanding elements of political morality, such as particular economic arrangements, 
forms of government, or conceptions of human rights27.  
                                                
26 Turner 2000, p 5 
27 Peerenboom 2002, p 3 
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In this sense, I would not try to suggest that there is a single type of rule of law, or try to make 
one type of “rule of law” fit the Chinese model by “concept stretching”. However, I will use 
the “thin” theory of rule of law, described above, to understand the core concept of rule of 
law, and then use various thick theories when understanding different conceptions of the 
whole system.  
 
4.2 Sources of law in China  
4.2.1 Law, regulations and policies 
There are several sources of law in China, but not all will be relevant for this thesis. I will be 
looking at national statues, in the form of law, and articles. A law, in the Chinese sense, is a 
statute that has been enacted by the NPC or its Standing Committee. Law serves as basic 
statutes in the national sphere of government28. The first and most important source of law for 
this thesis is the ONGO Law itself.  
Sometimes governmental branches issues regulations, also known as “provisions” and 
“measures”, these are the national administrative rules designed to implement a law or policy, 
and are usually issued by the State Council29. Regulations in China are viewed as a valid 
source of law, complimentary to statutes. In similar way, a set of rules, are usually issued by a 
ministry or a commission of the State Council within the limits of their competences, and 
often contain specific rules of interpretation or explanation of law or a regulation30. In regards 
of this thesis, such relevant supplementary work will be the “Guide to the registration of 
Representative Offices and Submitting Documents for the Recording of Temporary Activities 
of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations”31 (referred as the Guide), and the “Catalogue of 
Fields and Projects for ONGOs with Activities in China, and Directory of Organizations in 
Charge of Operations (2017)”32 (referred as the Catalogue) issued by the Ministry of Public 
Security at the end of 201633. Both “the Guide” and “the Catalogue” are giving indications on 
how to interpret the ONGO Law.   
                                                
28 Jiang 2017, p 330 
29 Jiang 2017, p 331 
30 Jiang 2017, p 331 
31 The Ministry of Public Security 2016a 
32 The Ministry of Public Security 2016b 





Another legal source that should be mentioned in this paper are policies. In China, custom is 
not considered as a general source of law. According to The General Principles of the Civil 
Law34, civil activities must be in compliance with the law; where there are no relevant 
provisions in the law, they shall be in compliance with state policies, hence depriving custom 
of general enforceability in the civil law35. Policies can thus be a general source of law in 
China. In the case where no legal rules can be applied, state policies is granted binding force. 
Where there is no pertinent legal provision, policies amount to a direct source of law, meaning 
that citizen and governmental conduct must comply with the relevant state policy36. 
Therefore, before the ONGO Law came into effect, Chinese policies played a role in 
regulating the ONGOs.  
 
4.2.2 The court and the procuratorate 
In China, another source of law comes from the court and the procuratorate. The reform and 
opening up to the world led to a litigation boom. In 1978, 613,000 cases were tried by the 
courts at all levels37, while the cases accepted in 2013 grew up to 14,217,000 cases38. The 
boom has stimulated further development of the legal profession and greater public and 
private expenditure on the legal practice. However, Chinese law does not consider judgments 
to establish legal precedent, at least not as formally binding on the courts. The Supreme 
People’s Court gives interpretations on questions concerning specific application of laws and 
decrees in juridical proceedings. According to Jiang (2017, p 323) the practice of interpreting 
laws and decrees by the Supreme People’s Court has developed in recent years to an extent 
that is called “juridical legislation”. This was not previously defined in the constitutional law. 
However, the legislation does require guidance in order to fill gaps and to solve conflicts and 
some vagueness among the laws so that effective enforcement can be carried out by the 
judicial branch. The Supreme People’s Courts can also compile guiding cases as necessary aid 
to juridical reasoning. The guiding case system will exert far-reaching impact on the Chinese 
civil law legal system. Compared with juridical interpretations, guiding cases reassemble 
                                                
34 The full version of the The General Principles of the Civil Law can be found at 
https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/zh/text.jsp?file_id=182628  
35 Jiang 2017, p 335 
36 Jiang 2017, p 335-336 
37 Zhu 2914, p 105-106 
38 Jian 2017, p 326 
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more significantly the doctrine of precedent of common law system39. However, there are still 
no guiding cases on the basis of the ONGO law since there have been no cases, as far as I 
have found, processed in the court system, and has also not yet reached the Supreme People’s 
Court. But with more and more organizations initiating public interest lawsuits40, there is a 
possibility that this could be relevant in the future. In China, like in some other civil law 
countries, the typical decision is short, concise and lacking explanation or justification. This 
may not give sufficient explanation about what rule of law should be and potentially causing 
confusion among the litigants and judges. Therefore a reasoning from a future guiding case on 
the ONGO law would possibly enhance the clarity of rules applied with the ONGO law.  
 
4.3 Law in action 
As mentioned above, I will need to disclose my reasoning behind treating in example 
interviews with the legal subjects, which many would not consider to be a valid source of law, 
as part of the discussion and analysis of the legal situation for ONGOs in China. 
Before going deeper into the theoretical nature of this question, and as a basic preliminary 
point of departure, the Oxford dictionaries defines law as “The system of rules which a 
particular community recognizes as regulating the actions of its members and which it may 
enforce by the imposition of penalties”41. The definition implies that not only formal law and 
statutes, but any kind of rules and norms are law, as long as they are enforced by the 
community as a whole, in this case the Chinese state power. Prior to the implementation of 
the ONGO law, this understanding of law was fundamental to how ONGOs stayed out of 
trouble with the Chinese state. ONGOs would use their contacts within the Chinese state 
system to predict whether or not their activity would be sanctioned or not, disregarding if 
these sanctions would be legal in nature or not. After the ONGO law took effect this system 
has been replaced by a formalized system of rules, but the new regulations has also been built 
upon the already existing system of permission by and cooperation with Chinese state organs.  
In an attempt to interpret Roscoe Pound’s ideas from the famous article “Law in Books and 
Law in Action” from the 1910, Jean-Louis Halperin believes that there is a way to combine 
the positivist approach with legal analysis of the rule of change, and that it can be 
                                                
39 Jiang 2017, p 333 
40 Yao 2015 





distinguished from sociological perspectives. Halperin criticize different approaches in the 
study of law, such as classical normativism (supposing that legal science reproduces legal 
norms), realism (considering that legal facts are revealed by juridical decisions), and 
discursive analysis (which amalgamates all legal statements), for denying the importance of 
the gap between “law in books” and “law in action”42. In this sense these theories risk the 
belief that law only exists through scholarly discourse and by this creating a virtual world, and 
underestimating the law’s grip on reality. Law in action, defined by Halperin is “law in 
change”: “a legal science aware of the relativity of its constructed object but anxious to be 
closely linked to empirical data supposes a study of these changes in norms”43.  
Halperin argues that an understanding of human behavior is not found in the relationships 
between cause and effect, but through the interpretation of human actions and the treatment of 
single individuals as basic units44. He argues that if law consists of principles and 
interpretations, and not of rules, the gap between law in action and law in books is easier to 
ascertain: law in action is created through legal discourses which are confused and conflated 
with discourses about law that we can find in books45. In this way one could argue that legal 
text exists and acquire meaning through the interpretation of its readers. Halperin therefore 
state that Pound’s formula, “law in books” is useful as it is based on some minimal definition 
of what counts as law, and is dependent on the respective roles that are assigned to 
constructed legal orders and empirically recognizable norms46. This reasoning might not be 
far away from the jurisprudence of concepts, as practiced by German Pandecectists in the 
nineteenth century. But by this, he encourages any student of law to check the ideal-type 
constructions by confronting them with empirical reality.  
In studying the authoritarian Chinese case where rule of law is weak and even policies can be 
a legal source, the reasoning of law in action is useful as it not just examines the role of law, 
in terms of statutes and cases, but it actually examines how law is applied in the society and 
asks “How does this affect people’s lives in the real world”.  
I have conducted interviews with ONGOs and experts in order to discover how the legal 
situation of ONGOs is perceived in action. Choosing this method of research is not entirely 
simple within the framework of legal theory. There are many opinions on how to delineate 
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what is considered to be subject of legal study, and what is more closely related to other 
scholarly disciplines. 
At the same time that we accept that legal sociology can help legal scientists to understand 
human behavior as it relates to law, Halperin notes that we also must realize that only law 
produces law, it is not produced by external factors. Having this in mind, the thesis will use a 
combination of the law itself, the supplementary work, as well as how the law affects the 
people living with the law.  
 
5. ONGO law 
5.1 Historical and political context to the ONGO law 
Before going into the analysis of the ONGO Law, we have to understand what was the 
situation for ONGOs in China before the ONGO act. When ONGOs first began to establish in 
China in the late 1970s and 80s, there were no laws or guidelines that regulated how they 
should register, be managed, or their activity. During the “reform and opening” period, the 
Chinese government’s attitude and policy toward overseas NGOs was to tolerate them by 
default, and to avoid issuing a clear set of policies and regulations that would legitimize their 
presence47. Deng (2010, p 190) calls this the “three no policy”, “no recognition, no banning, 
no intervention”. He argues that in order to understand the government’s position, we need to 
recognize the system of hidden rules used by the local governmental and Civil Affairs 
Departments to administer the overseas NGOs48. 
In the absence of regulations, ONGOs still found ways to operate, some registering as foreign 
enterprises and others did not register at all. It was not until the late 80s that the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs developed internal guidelines for ONGOs, saying that authorities should not ban 
or intervene with ONGOs unless they threatened the state security or social stability49. In 
2000, the Provisional Regulations for Banning Illegal NGOs were issued, labeling many 
NGOs, both overseas and domestic, as illegal, but still generally tolerated in accordance to the 
internal guidelines50. Further, in 2004 more regulations were issued, and the Ministry of Civil 
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Affairs requested that foreign foundations were re-registered under the Foundation 
Management regulations. In their report “The Roles and Challenges of International NGOs in 
China’s Development”, Dr. Shieh and Knutson (2012) found that this appeared not as easy for 
organizations that were not well connected and did not have a clear defined area of work, as 
one of the requirements was to have a professional supervisory unit (PSU). In example, the 
Ford Foundation, with a long history in China, had more difficulty securing a PSU because 
they worked in multiple areas, than for example the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
which had been working closely with the Ministry of Health51.  
On one hand, the government sees ONGOs as valuable in providing assistance in addressing 
China’s many development challenges. On the other the government wary of the potential 
role ONGOs can play as competitors, and specially the ONGOs engagement in promoting 
democracy and “Western values”52. The suspicion of Western NGOs became especially 
visible after the “color revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia in 2004, where civil society 
played a key role in bringing down the authoritarian governments of the former Soviet 
republics. Chinese authorities thus launched an investigation of both ONGOs and Chinese 
NGOs in China53. Activities related to human rights advocacy, religious organizations, 
workers rights and ethnic minority rights has therefore been, and still is, under close scrutiny 
by the Chinese state. How the government has handled such organizations in the past, has led 
to an understanding of which issues and activities that are viewed as more sensitive than 
others.  
As the “Overseas NGO Law” was announced during the National People’s Congress’s press 
conference, the National Standing Committee’s Deputy Director of Law, Zhang Yongdan, 
stated that “certainly there is a very small number of overseas NGOs who have attempted or 
have even already done things that threaten the stability of Chinese society or security”. This 
background to the “Overseas NGO Law”, symbolizes that China’s level of consideration 
towards national security cannot be compromised, Tsinghua University professor Jia Xijin 
concludes54. From the “three no policy” to having a clear legislation, Jia argues that one could 
think that the formulation of the Overseas NGO Law is the result of combining worries about 
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national security and the rule of law concept of national governance. And that the challenges 
and opportunities this law presents also comes from this source55.  
 
5.2 Analysis of The ONGO law 
5.2.1. Overview of the act 
The ONGO Law took force the 1st of January 2017 and is divided into seven chapters. The 
first chapter contains general provisions, second, rules for registration and document 
submission, third, rules for activity specifications, fourth, facilitation measures required by 
the Chinese government, fifth, rules of oversight and supervision, sixth, rules of legal 
liabilities, and seventh, supplementary provisions. The thesis will not go into each chapter by 
itself, but rather analyze the law thematically according to key issues, starting with 
applicability, followed by rules of registration, control and supervision, facilitation, and 
liability. The thesis will not analyze every article, but focus on the most important aspects.  
 
5.2.2 Who does the law apply to? 
Article 1 of the law states the intentions behind the law, which is “regulating and guiding the 
activities in the mainland of China of nongovernmental organizations from outside China’s 
mainland (hereinafter referred to as “overseas NGOs”), as well as protecting their legitimate 
rights and interests and facilitating communication and cooperation.” Article 2 second 
sentence defines “Overseas NGOs” as “foundations, social groups, think tanks and other non-
profit, nongovernmental social organizations legally established overseas.” Other than giving 
some non-exhaustive examples, the law emphasizes that the organizations have to be “non-
profit”, “nongovernmental” and “legally established overseas” in order for the law to apply. 
The law does not make further specifications on what is considered “non-profit” or 
“nongovernmental”, which could point to that the law is to be given a wide interpretation in 
this regard. The purpose of the law and the context of its adoption, it is the only law 
governing organizations of this nature, also points towards the same interpretation, that if 
there is uncertainty towards the degree of an organizations “non-governmental-ness”, i.e. how 
                                                





strong ties the organization has to the government both in connection and funding, the law 
would include rather than exclude such organizations from its jurisdiction.  
Article 2 first sentence states that the law applies to all “activities” in the mainland of China 
by ONGOs. The law does not give further information on what is considered “activity”, 
although the law’s purpose might suggest that the term is meant to include as many types of 
“activity” as appropriate for the law to be effective.   
In a meeting with consular officials from 11 countries on November 8th 2016, a 
representative from The MPS’ Foreign NGO Management Bureau said that there would be no 
“transition period” or “grace period” after the law was to take effect on January 1st 201756. 
Based on the vague language in the above-mentioned articles, it seems like the law is meant to 
be applied as widely as possible under administrative discretion, starting from the moment the 
law takes effect. The law aims to treat all ONGOs of all legal areas of operations equally, 
making the law general in its application despite the diversity of organizations and areas 
affected. Before the law took effect the Chinese authorities treated different organizations and 
areas quite differently, based on the ONGOs’ level of cooperation, compliance and areas they 
worked in. Although the law aims towards a general application, the vagueness and catch-all 
language reflected throughout the law could still point towards the law opening for 
organizations to be treated differently based on the discretion of the authorities.  
 
5.2.3 The rules and alternatives for registration 
Chapter two of the law deals with the registrations process of the ONGOs. Article 9 sets up 
two ways to legally carry out activity in China: Either opening up a representative office or 
filing for temporary activity. Articles 10 to 15 describe the rules for registering a 
representative office, and articles 16 and 17 describe the rules for registering temporary 
activities. I will here give a short overview on how this system works.  
To establish as a representative office, the ONGO, according to Article 10, must be  
(1) legally established overseas; (2) Able to independently bear civil liability; (3) Purposes 
and business scopes specified in the articles of association that benefit public welfare; (4) 
Existed and engaged in substantive activities overseas for more than two years; (5) Other 
conditions stipulated by laws and administrative regulations. According to the Center for 
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Charity Law of the China Philanthropy Research Institute at Beijing Normal University, evidence 
of legal establishment outside Mainland China refers to evidence that an organization has 
been registered overseas with relevant government agencies, and is an independent legal 
person able to bear civil liability. Documents demonstrating the non-profit nature of an 
organization will vary depending on the relevant laws and regulations of that specific country 
or region that the ONGO is first established57. This relates to Article 15, which deals with the 
cancellation of a representative office. Article 15’s last sentence states that the representative 
office does not bear individual liability, and all legal liabilities are transferred to the ONGO 
itself. It is unclear if this rule only applies to the cancellation of a representative office, but the 
system of the law implies that this rule applies generally, although not directly stated 
elsewhere.  
Article 11 state that the organizations shall seek the approval of “organizations in charge of 
their operations,” generally referred to by the international community as “Professional 
Supervisory Units” (PSUs), based on earlier translations of drafts of the law58. Article 11 
second paragraph further states that the MPS are to make a directory of eligible PSUs public, 
which is also repeated in Article 34. This has been issued in “the Catalogue”59, as mentioned 
earlier. Article 12 further states that the ONGOs, after receiving permission from a PSU, shall 
apply to the registration authority to register a representative office. “The registration 
authority” is, as stated in Article 6, “The Ministry of Public Security under the State Council 
and public security organs of provincial-level people’s governments”, hereafter referred to as 
“the MPS” for simplicity.  
According to Article 13, if the application to establish a representative office is accepted, the 
ONGO will receive a registration certificate and an engraved seal60 from the MPS, who will 
then publicly announce the acceptance. The registration certificate and seal will then have to 
be used to register for tax and open a bank account, after which the ONGO will submit a copy 
of the tax registration certificate, a sample of their seal, and their bank account details to the 
MPS, according to the last paragraph of Article 13. Changes to the registration information 
must first be approved by the PSU then the MPS, according to Article 14.  
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The second way to legally carry out activity in China, without having established a 
representative offices as described above, is to register to conduct temporary activities. Article 
16 states that the activity then has to be conducted in cooperation with “State organs, people’s 
organizations, public institutions and social organizations”, referred to in the law as “Chinese 
partners”. As Prof. Shieh states on his blog, it is important to not confuse “Chinese partners” 
with PSUs. PSUs are generally different governmental agencies of municipalities, 
administration, commissions and bureaus, in the ONGO main field or area. While “Chinese 
partners” can be more varied types of organizations. Prof. Shieh writes that Chinese Partners 
can be “a government agency, a people's organization (e.g. Women's Federation, Communist 
Youth League, etc.), public institution (e.g. universities and research institutes), and social 
organizations (e.g. NGOs). The Chinese Partner also has no supervisory authority over the 
NGO. The NGO enjoys more of an equal relationship with the Chinese Partner61”, although 
the Chinese partner still has important responsibilities in getting the right approvals and filing 
documents for the ONGO.  
Article 17 states that it is the Chinese partners of overseas NGOs who shall handle 
examination and approval procedures in accordance with State regulations and submit to local 
registration authorities when conducting temporary activities. The ONGOs conducting 
temporary activities has, compared to the ones opening representative offices, a much more 
limited scope of economic and legal rights, and will need to conduct most of their operations 
in cooperation with the Chinese partner, which further elevates the Chinese partners 
responsibility and risk of liability.  
Another important difference between registering for a representative office and temporary 
activity is that Article 9 states that ONGOs who want to conduct temporary activities shall 
“submit documents for the record to this effect”. This means, theoretically, that ONGOs who 
want to conduct temporary activities only need approval from the Chinese partner, and is only 
required to inform the MPS by submitting the correct documentation.  
When it comes to the definition of “Temporary activity”, Shieh has pointed out that there is a 
mistake in the English translation of the law, that makes it seem like the term is only defined 
for “emergency situations”, to be activity that does not exceed one year. According to Shieh, 
the one-year limitation rule is separated in its own paragraph in the original Chinese text, 
starting from the semi-colon in the second paragraph first sentence of the English translation, 
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and without there being a “however” connecting the two sentences62. “Temporary activity” is 
therefore, in the law, presumed to be activity that does not exceed one year. The last 
paragraph of Article 17 further states that the MPS can order the Chinese partner to cease the 
temporary activity if they believe that Article 5 has been breached.  
 
5.2.3 Control and Supervision 
The rules presented in this part are closely related to the preceding chapter, but the analysis 
will try to give a picture of the extent of oversight and supervision that the ONGOs are 
subjected to under the law.  
Article 19 and Article 30 second paragraph requires the ONGOs to document and report their 
activity. Article 19 states that the representative office each year shall submit a plan for their 
activities in the following year, including projects and use of funds first to the PSU for 
approval, and then to the registration authorities. ONGOs and Chinese partners conducting 
temporary activities have to report on their activities, detailing their activities and use of funds 
to the registration authorities. The representative office also has to report on their previous 
year’s work to the MPS for annual inspection, according to Article 31. According to the 
second paragraph the reports should include an audited financial report, details of activities 
and personnel or organizational changes.  
Article 22 states that ONGOs have to manage their funds for use in China through the 
representative offices’ bank accounts that are registered with the registration authorities. 
Second paragraph further state that ONGOs conducting temporary activity have to use the 
Chinese partners bank accounts, implement separate accounting and earmark funds for 
specific purposes. The third paragraph specifies that no other means are allowed to receive or 
make payments in China. This rule is related to Article 42, which gives the MPS power to 
access and freeze bank accounts.  
Article 39, first article of chapter five “oversight and supervision” is a general rule stating that 
“Overseas NGOs carrying out activities in the mainland of China shall accept the oversight 
and supervision of public security organs, relevant departments and organizations in charge of 
operations.” Article 40 further specifies that PSUs responsibility in regards to the ONGOs 
representative office is issuing comments, changing registered details, compiling annual work 
                                                





reports, guiding and overseeing the representative office activities and assisting public 
security organs and other departments in investigations of illegal behavior.  
The MPS’s responsibility in regards of the representative offices is, according to Article 41 
first paragraph, registration and annual inspections. In regards of temporary activity they are 
responsible for receiving submission of necessary documents, and in regards of both 
representative offices and temporary activities they are responsible for investigating and 
punishing illegal behavior. According to the second paragraph, the MPS can initiate 
investigative measures if they “discover behavior they suspect violates the provisions of this 
Law in the course of performing oversight and supervision”, meaning that illegal behavior has 
to be discovered during oversight and supervision, and that the MPS cannot arbitrarily 
investigate the ONGOs. Suspicion grants the MPS the power to interview with 
representatives, inspect the premises or site of the activities, question organizations and 
individuals related to the investigating incident and require them to clarify matters related to 
the incident being investigated, consult and copy relevant documents and materials, seal up 
for safekeeping documents or materials that could otherwise be moved, destroyed, concealed 
or altered, and shut down premises and facilities, or seize property, suspected of involvement 
in illegal activities.  
As evident from the described rules, the amount of information the ONGOs has to provide to 
the MPS is quite extensive. The PSUs have a large responsibility of the day-to-day 
supervision of the ONGOs, and in addition to the investigative powers of the MPS, the law 
seems to make the ONGOs unable to operate without open cards. When comparing the 
generalism of the rules of liability described in the thesis, and the extensiveness of the powers 
of supervision and investigation described above, the law seems to require high carefulness of 
the ONGOs. The rules prohibiting activities that are subjected to more political discretion, in 
example the prohibition of “political activity”, also requires the ONGOs to have a high level 
of awareness of the current political climate. The supervisory responsibilities of the PSUs, as 
well as their advisory responsibilities described in the chapter below, seems to encourage the 
ONGOs to use the PSUs as a main source of information in this regard. Compared to Western 
legal cultures where the principle of legality is emphasized, this aspect of the ONGO law 
seems especially characteristic of the authoritarian context of the law. The oversight and 
supervision stipulated in the ONGO law directs the ONGOs towards a strategy of cooperation 
and compliance, rather than bestowing the ONGOs with a mandate to act independently 





Chapter four deals with the facilitation measures in regards of the Chinese authorities duties 
to the ONGOs. It begins with the general rule, Article 33, stating that the State shall safeguard 
and support ONGOs in carrying out activities in accordance with the law in the mainland of 
China, and that relevant departments at all levels shall provide the necessary assistance and 
services for ONGOs to carry out the activities. According to Article 34, the MPS and other 
relevant government departments shall compile lists of the areas and projects of overseas 
NGOs, publish lists of PSUs, and provide guidance to overseas NGOs in carrying out their 
activities. Article 35 specifies that the government at or above county level should provide 
policy advice and guidance and services for the activities of overseas NGOs in accordance 
with the law. Second paragraph requires the MPS to also publish the procedures for overseas 
NGOs to apply to establish representative offices and submit the necessary documents for the 
record to carry out temporary activities. 
This chapter of the law, at first glance, can seem a bit contrary to the supervisory regime 
stipulated above. Although the rules in this chapter are formulated very generally, i.e. the duty 
to provide guidance or assistance, they points towards the same system of cooperation and 
compliance described above. Also, by legislating the duty to provide assistance and guidance, 
the lawmakers force the governmental authorities to build knowledge and expertise in how to 
deal with ONGOs, which in turn makes a cooperative and non-confrontational approach to 
regulating ONGOs more likely. In other words, the law gives the authorities a duty of 
facilitation and help to the ONGOs who are committed to compliance and cooperation.  
 
5.2.5 Liability 
This part will analyze what The ONGO Law regards as illegal behavior and how it is 
sanctioned, which is mainly regulated in Chapter 6 if the law. 
To start, Article 3 list areas of operation that are available for ONGOs. These are economy, 
education, science, culture, health, sports and environmental protection, as well as poverty 
and disaster relief. This list could be understood as exhaustive, and therefore excluding areas 
like human rights, workers’ rights and legal advocacy. However the last section of the 





legal service, trade union and gender equality. This indicates that the list in Article 3 is not 
exhaustive, as the catalogue opens up for a few more restricted areas for ONGO working with 
the listed PSUs. However, this does not necessarily imply that the topic of human rights will 
be accepted as legal service activity by the PSU.  
Article 5 is the general rule, and forbids ONGOs from threatening “China’s national 
reunification and security or ethnic unity”, “harm(ing) China’s national and social interests or 
the legitimate rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and other organizations”. Second 
paragraph further prohibits ONGOs to engage in or finance profit-making, political-, or 
religious activities in China. A legal definition of “political activities” and “religious 
activities” is not provided, which seems to be a consistent trend across all regulations meant 
to give the authorities legal discretion in matters of a more political nature. This is further 
reflected in Article 47, which will be examined below.  
Articles 45 and 46 deals with failure to adhere to the more specific rules of registration and 
operating in China without proper registration, respectively. Article 45 also regulates Chinese 
partners in addition to the ONGOs, which is related to the responsibilities of Chinese partners 
stipulated in Article 17. Breaches of the alternatives in Article 45 gives the city district public 
security organs the power to issue warnings or ordering a cease of activities within a deadline, 
confiscate illegal gains and stolen property, and under serious circumstances have the MPS 
suspend registration certificates or prohibit temporary activities. Second paragraph also 
prohibits falsifying information in the registration process. Breaches of the alternatives in 
Article 46 gives the city district public security organs the power to issue bans or order to 
cease illegal behavior, confiscate illegal gains and property, issue warnings to those directly 
responsible, and under serious circumstances detain those responsible for up to ten days.  
While Articles 45 and 46 implicitly refers to other rules in the law, Article 47 uses the catch-
all language of typical authoritarian legal prohibitions. Breaches of the alternatives gives the 
MPS the power to suspend registration certificates or prohibit temporary activity, as well as 
authorizing city district public security organs to detain those directly responsible for up to 
fifteen days. In the alternatives, vague phrasing like “inciting resistance to laws and 
regulations”, “engaging in other acts that endanger national security or harm national or 
public interests”, and “illegally obtaining State secrets”, points towards the discretionary 
interpretation of both the authorities and the judiciary. This is a legislative technique 
commonly used by the Chinese authorities to open up legal areas to political influence. Rules 
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like this especially exemplifies the need to use alternative sources to understand how the law 
is being enforced.  
Articles 48, 49 and 50 gives rules for 5 year activity bans, blacklisting, confiscation of 
certification and financial documents, and deportation, in the event of breaches of the articles 
mentioned above. Other prohibited activities include acting outside the scope registration or 
filing (Article 18 and 23), setting up branch organizations (Article 18), and engaging in 
fundraising (Article 21). 
 
6. Interviews and discussion 
Staying out of trouble with the government for a foreign NGO in an authoritarian regime is a 
much more complex endeavor than simply going to the official sources of law and trying to 
figure out what the rules say. In China, staying out of trouble also means adhering to 
unwritten rules and norms that are more political in nature, but with real potential sanctions 
behind them. Coming too close to sensitive issues and activities has in the past resulted in 
unwarranted searches or quasi-formal interrogations by the police, while treading over the line 
could result in extralegal abductions and beatings of staff members of ONGOs’ Chinese 
partner organizations, or arrests of ONGO staff members and subsequent bans from re-
entering China. Although the ONGO law now regulates the registration of ONGOs, the parts 
of the law relating to illegal activity is still based on many vague, general terms, open to 
interpretation. The system of the law seems to indicate that the former system of using 
extralegal norms and policies in order to regulate ONGO activity has come to stay. In order to 
access these unwritten rules and norms, as well as to try to discover other discrepancies 
between the law in books and the law in action, I will now analyze and discuss the results 
from the interviews in regards of the key issues of the law discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
6.1 Applicability and general provisions  
Among the ONGOs interviewed there were several ways to handle the law coming into effect. 
Subject E’s organization was one of the first ONGOs to register under the new law. The 
organization was registered for almost 10 years as a non-profit enterprise, under The State 





new registration process. Also subject G’s organization, which before was formally registered 
as a business, was also registering as an ONGO under the new law. The reason for this, G 
explains, is that “we also wanted to demonstrate to our government counterparts that we are 
doing everything to be compliant”.   
The decision of registering under the new law, and how to go about the process of doing so, 
has however not been as easy for most of the subject interviewed. Subject B’s organization, 
wanted to register a representative office, but until that process could be finished the ONGO 
was to apply for a temporary registration for all activity. Others, like Subject As organization, 
withdrew its operations in China, seeking to stay out until they were able to register. The 
same accounts for the ONGO of subject D, which was not registered before and interpreted 
that the law would make their activity illegal, and therefore paused the implementation of new 
programs, and applied for a temporary activity-registration on just one of their programs. 
Both subject B and D expressed the need for registering a representative office, and that the 
process of temporary registration would be too resource consuming in the long run. Also 
Subject H’s organization closed down their office and decided to suspend trainings and 
workshops, which is one of their main activities, but are still working from home on research 
and writing, excluding field research, which was also suspended.  
Other organizations made new strategies in order to try to avoid the ONGO law being applied 
to them. The organization of Subject C believed that the implementation of the ONGO law 
did not benefit the organization to label themselves an ONGO: “We've realized that as much 
as being a non-profit or an NGO, is more in line with our vision and mission to create this 
platform, it's not beneficial to us with the introduction of the new NGO law, it can only be 
detrimental, it can only raise questions about our legitimacy as an organization, both for the 
Chinese government and for our funders.” The strategy of the ONGO of subject C was instead 
to register as a business and operate as a for-profit organization, and to not use the term “non-
governmental” or “non-profit” in any of their communications, such as documents or website. 
“That was because we knew the companies and organizations that call themselves NGOs, 
non-profits, it's likely they will face more scrutiny, they'll be more visible for that reason”, 
subject C explained. Other than this change of communication strategy, the organization did 
not change any operations, “things have just continued, business as usual”, subject C 
explained.  
“Staying under the radar” was the strategy of subject F’s organization. The organization was 
registered in New York, and was wholly self-funded by Subject F. In China, it was registered 
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as a WFOE (Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise). Subject F’s organization decided not to 
register under the ONGO law, after being in contact with some consulting firms. Subject F 
explained that F’s organization therefore went out of their ways to stay under the radar 
because working with education and young children was regarded as especially sensitive by 
the government. F’s organization wanted to continue to carry out their programs as effectively 
as possible, but F felt that the registration affected their operations too negatively to be worth 
it.  
Both Subject E and Subject A problematized the time of the law taking effect. “The law didn't 
give a buffer time to say for how long people can explore, learn and go through the process, 
because if we don't have the Ministry of Civil Affairs to transfer us automatically to the 
Ministry of Public Security, we will be running through days without being covered by the 
law. That part was not clear,” Subject E explained. Also Subject H questioned what they 
could do under the current situation, as they were not registered, but was looking into how to 
register: “Can we pay staff? Can we rent an office? Can we go to the office every day? In 
terms of activities, can we continue to do trainings? Can we do trainings here in China? Can 
we talk to our partners?”, Subject H asked. Subject A did not view the 1st of January as the 
actual deadline as upon inquiry with a contact within the MPS, they was told that the MPS 
would not be working then because it is a public holiday. "So January 1st is not a deadline. By 
law and for a legal person it's a deadline, but for China it's a starting point. "Let's start from 
that and see",” they explained. 
In total, the interview subjects were generally under the impression that the law would apply 
to them. Some accepted both the new law and the registration regime and was decidedly 
seeking to comply with the new law, while others was primarily looking for ways to avoid the 
law being applied to them. The ones who were most uncertain about the decision either chose 
to withdraw from China or suspend activities, seeking to tentatively register temporary 
activities or waiting to see how the law would be applied before seeking to register. This 
uncertainty also stretched to when the law would be applied, even though both the law and 










Subject A’s organization decided to not initially registering because the registration process 
was, in their opinion, too complicated, and they could not decide on the specifics of their 
registration. Even though the rules for registration might seem comprehensible as explained in 
the preceding chapter of this thesis, the process is still too unclear for some ONGOs to make a 
strategically sound choice. “The decision is based on your knowledge. If you don't have that 
much knowledge about how China works, it's very hard to make the right decision,” Subject 
A explained.  
The strategy of Subject D’s organization was to take it slow and see what the new legal 
situation would mean for them. They were unsure about whom to seek out as their PSU, as 
they were active in several areas of operation. This was a problem for several organizations 
that had activities on different topics. Because the PSUs are sorted by areas of operation, the 
ONGOs themselves have to choose one or the other, even though they would define 
themselves as working in both. In Subject D’s case, they had to choose between justice and 
education. It is still not clear according to the law if the organization registered under one 
topic can have activities related to another topic. Subject D explained that their organization 
might have to change their scope of activities in regards of this, and that the organization was 
still waiting for the answer to this.  
Paradoxically, what might seem like the most comprehensible part of the law, supplied by the 
Guidelines, was the part about the law that was making the ONGOs interviewed the most 
uncertain. This is perhaps related to the fact that this part of the law leads to the most change 
in the ONGOs’ legal situation. Instead of relying on the advice from contacts in the 
government, the ONGOs would have to refer to the law and its interpretation by the MPS. 
Several interview subjects reflected Subject A’s view that the law taking effect was just a 
starting point in the enforcement of the law, as many of them was under the impression that 
the MPS and PSUs themselves were either uncertain about the ONGO law’s interpretation on 
specific registration procedures or unwilling to release their interpretation without 






6.3 Control and Supervision 
The subjects that already had established regular communication with higher governmental 
branches was also the furthest along in the process of registration. Some had relationships 
with ministries of reporting and reviewing before the ONGO law took effect, and found the 
new supervisory system a necessary evil in the tradeoff for closer ties and more influence with 
the PSUs. Some subjects also welcomed the clarification of the supervisory regime in the law: 
“Well first of all it's a law. It's better than no law. Secondly it involves public security 
departments into it, which gives the legitimacy. In the old days when public security was 
always behind it, but never in the front. Now it becomes something more obvious,” Subject A 
said. They continued, explaining that before the law, public security organs could i.e. 
eavesdrop or hack emails, but with the new law Subject A believed that such surveillance is 
more transparent. “You can not hide. Good or bad, I think it's a demonstration of China's 
government that they want to take control of the situation. So I have no comments about how 
good or bad it is, how positive or negative, but it's a position that China has put on the table, 
rather than under the table”, they said.  
Subject E explained that there was a lot of experimentation on the government’s part before 
the ONGO law: “When there is no regulational laws, you work with the relevant authorities to 
figure out what is that gonna be.” When there was no law, they explained, “you could just 
come in and work without following any regulations or running the risk of not following the 
law, as there was no law. It's a situation that was not clear”. Regarding the quasi-lawless 
situation the subjects describe, assuming that the supervision will be carried out according to 
the ONGO law, what in a Western perspective might be perceived as a draconian control 
regime could actually be viewed as a step closer towards rule of law for civil society in China. 
Subject F did not share this view however: “The law changes almost nothing”, they believed. 
They held that no one was immune to getting in trouble with the Chinese government, even if 
registered: “Now, if an NGO does something that the government dislikes, they can pull out 
the law and point to the illegality of the organization”. They remarked that although some 
types of activity is illegal, NGOs can still do it as long as they don’t step on any toes. Subject 
F believed that there are more between the lines of the law. They thought that the ONGO law 
introduced a surface level openness in the civil society sector, but that, if read between the 
lines, the law set in place a system that made it easier for the police to shut down ONGOs. 





examined, they are more likely to close the ONGO down because that is the easiest solution 
for the police, and with the new ONGO law they will have the authority to do so.  
Subject A was also skeptical, and explained that their organization had been working with top 
think tanks, policy makers and regulators for many years without any trouble. With the new 
law, the PSUs was Subject A’s main concern about the law. They did not see or understand 
what the PSUs get out of the heavy administration process. Subject A characterized it as a 
burden on the government. “Registration is one thing. If you get registered, that's fine. Then 
what?,” they asked. 
So is the control and supervision regime in the ONGO law a step towards rule of law? It 
depends on which standards you’d use, and what the step towards rule of law is a step away 
from. Considering that before the law there was little to no regulations that the authorities 
would have to adhere to, or laws that the ONGOs could use to predict their relationship with 
the controlling organs, the implementation of the ONGO law gives both parties a frame of 
reference. On the other hand, the ONGO law has very limited amounts of judicial control 
mechanisms, and it’s hard to tell if the MPS or the PSUs will adhere to the law as a 
framework for the ONGOs’ predictability. At the same time, many of the articles regulating 




Subject E explained that they see an advantage in having a law that provides channels to 
contact the authorities with inquiries: “In the past there was no laws on how NGOs should 
work in China. Basically everybody was trying their own way and there was no protection, no 
channels for filing complaints, even if you wanted to, no channels to look for support.” With 
the new law, Subject E explains that there are organizations and agencies you can contact in 
regards to your issues. “So in a way we see this as progress”, they conclude.  
However, at the time the interviews were conducted, some already had negative experiences 
with the law’s facilitating measures. According to Subject D, who at the time was looking for 
information on how to pick a PSU for an ONGO with activities in two different fields, the 
PSUs, in this case being ministries, was not answering their inquiries and did not seem ready 
for the issue. As mentioned earlier, this might be related to the implementation date of the law 
being regarded as a “starting point” for the new system to grow into its intended form. Other 
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interview subjects were not convinced that all the PSUs were welcoming the increased 
responsibility brought by the ONGO law.  
On the other hand, the legal status, and the “stamp of approval” from the government, as 
some subjects were noting, could increase the perceived trustworthiness of ONGOs in 
potential PSUs. “The obstacle is that the ministries usually don't want to host any NGOs they 
don't know or trust, because the political risk is quite high”, Subject E explained.  
Although there was no law making the cooperation between government and ONGOs 
mandatory before the ONGO law, some ONGOs developed relationships to the ministries in 
order to secure their legal position. Subject D explains that their organization tried to have 
annual meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in order to make sure that their 
activities were in line with the authorities’ view. The organization also made sure to ask their 
partners to apply for all activities to the MFA and also sign a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP). This was process was working well 
until 2014/2015, when also several other interview subjects described the start of a tighter 
control regime from the authorities. 
Several sources, such as Subject H, confirms subject D’s description of the change in the 
government’s agenda before the ONGO law was drafted. Subject D explained that it got 
harder to work on Human Rights issues, and systems for funding got more complicated. 
Subject D further told that the bureaucracy became heavier and political signals and 
communication towards ONGOs resulted in more self-censorship amongst the ONGOs and 
less willingness to cooperate amongst partners. Some of the practical challenges were related 
to uncertainty about visa, which again affected the uncertainty about working permission and 
subsequently the organization’s presence and activities in China. The political situation made 
partners more nervous and hesitant to cooperation, and Subject D’s organization therefore 
asked the MFA for a law that was more in line with the principles of rule of law. However the 
ONGO law, in Subject D’s organization’s opinion, was not what they wished for. Around the 
time the ONGO law was passed in 2016, the aggressive line towards ONGOs softened. 
Subject A explained: “Because they have the law now. And they are waiting for you to come 
to them. They don't have to sneak to you. Right now, if you want to register, you have to talk 
to the police. So now it's everything on the table.” 
Although the ONGO law did not live up to Subject D’s expectations in regards to rule of law, 





the law. As some of the other interview subjects pointed out, the law should be able to make it 
easier for compliant ONGOs to gain a predictable and comprehensible legal status, which 
would benefit them in a plethora of ways, at least compared to what was before. The 
facilitation measures in the law are meant to ensure that. However, whether or not the duties 
to guide and assist the ONGOs stipulated in the law will come to replace or supplement the 
system of cooperation present before the law is still uncertain. The law is vague enough to not 
discourage favoritism from the PSUs, and although the law has opened the channels for 
cooperation and facilitation, not all PSUs might view the relationships as beneficial ones. The 
vagueness and lack of control mechanisms also highlights a possibility for the PSUs to get 
away with interpreting the law to its bare minimum, leaving up the each PSU to decide just 
how helpful and facilitating they would like to be.  
 
6.5 Liability 
When asked about how they interpret unclear parts of the ONGO law, most of the interview 
subjects explain that they read the law to find out what's legal or illegal, and have hired legal 
help from lawyers or consultants for further interpretation. However, as discussed in the 
theoretical chapter, there are several unintuitive sources of law in China; policies could be 
considered a source of law, especially in order to interpret politically influenced rules like 
Article 47 of the ONGO law. When faced with the question of what strategies they use to 
avoid sensitive issues or “stay out of trouble” with the authorities, the subject’s answers 
became more diverse.  
Subject A explained that they would also ask ministries, other potentially PSUs, MPS, the 
police, other NGOs, and/or Chinese scholars in order to understand the content of the law. 
Subject A expressed it like this: “Registration is just something to help you get legalized. But 
legal doesn't mean everything. In the past 40 years we have seen legal and illegal, there's not 
much difference.” Several subjects explained that their Chinese or governmental partners 
often explained to them what’s sensitive and not. Subject G explained it like this: “Basically 
our government partners tell us. They’ll say “this is sensitive”. But, interestingly, different 
people have slightly different opinions on that, or people are trying to self-monitor, you know, 
or self-regulate themselves on that, so it’s difficult.” Subject G further stressed the importance 
of paying attention to the signals, meaning actions, indicators or statements from the 
government. “ The International Corporation Department (ICD) of The Ministry of 
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Environmental Protection (MEP), they have the final word on whether something is wanted or 
not”, they said. 
The interview have different pre-ONGO law experiences with walking the line between 
what’s considered legal or not, and coming close to the line. Subject J explained that “usually 
the government finds one small thing that becomes the official legal reason for why the 
organizations is closed down. Usually, organizations that are getting in trouble will first get a 
warning, and will then be supervised for a long time. This could for example come in a form 
of an invitation from the police to come drink tea with them”. Several of the subjects 
mentioned the tea meetings with the police as a semi-mandatory quasi-formal form of 
interrogation, others told about talks with the MPS about surveillance, or of a “redlist” and a 
“whitelist” of organizations that are trusted or requires caution63.  
Some interview subjects also spoke of another strategy to avoid sensitive issues: 
Experimentation and exploring. “First of all, you're not challenged,” Subject A said. “We 
didn't get any questioning of [Subject A’s organization] doing something wrong, or being 
challenged by them (the authorities), saying what we do is not good or risky for China. We 
never heard about it, because we've been cautious. We are sensitive about it and try to avoid 
anything like that,” Subject A continued. This comprehension, that ONGOs will be notified 
when about to “cross the line”, was shared among most of the interview subjects. Some even 
said that this approach was what made them able to try new strategies and push borders.  
Few of the interview subjects believed that using the experimental approach after the ONGO 
law took effect would get them thrown out of China right away. First they expected to get a 
couple of warnings, as Subject G explained: “I think the way it (The ONGO law) will be 
applied is that it's gonna be applied for dummies, right? So you're gonna get a warning, you're 
gonna get another warning, you're gonna get a talk, you're gonna get told that you're gonna 
get thrown out of the country, you know? Then you get thrown out of the country, then you 
come back again, you're still doing this thing, you know? Then maybe you get thrown in jail.” 
Subject G advised to step back already after receiving the first warning: “Because that means 
that you have stepped as far as you could have stepped.  If you overstep that boundary, you 
could do that maybe once or twice, but it's not sustainable. You quickly get yourself in the 
wrong position. And then I don't get invited to the party anymore, right?”  
                                                
63 Red, being a lucky color in Chinese culture, signaling that the ONGO is trusted, while the white list signals 
caution. There are also a rumoured blacklist of ONGOs that are not to be trusted at all, but only one interview 





Subject G’s advice was echoed by several of the interview subjects. Especially the subjects 
connected to environmental ONGOs viewed the best strategy for staying out of trouble with 
the government and how to successfully pursue their operational goals as two sides of the 
same issue. Both would require close ties with the government, to be able to obtain updated 
information on which issues would be considered sensitive, and to have the greatest amount 
of influence over Chinese environmental policy possible. In any case, all of the interview 
subjects emphasized the importance of seeking informed partners or allies; the closer to the 
powers in charge of policy in the ONGOs area of activity, the better.  
Prior to the ONGO law, in the events where an ONGO was advised or ordered by either 
public security officials or partners to cease certain activities, none of the interview subjects 
had ever experienced being supplied with legal arguments for doing so, or even heard about 
any other ONGO that had. Subject A spoke about veiled threats in tea meetings especially 
aimed towards representatives of Chinese partner organizations, and even of an event where a 
representative of a Chinese partner organization was abducted, interrogated and beaten. To 
Subject A, keeping up with the authorities’ perception of what was considered sensitive or not 
was regarded as a security concern.  
The introduction of the ONGO law does not seem to do away with this sensitivity interpretive 
system entirely. While the rules regarding compliance with the registration and supervision 
regime, in example Articles 45 and 46 in the law, seems fairly comprehensible, the rules that 
are open to political interpretation, in example Articles 47 and 5, would necessitate ONGOs 
who register under the law to still participate in at least parts of the pre-ONGO law 
“sensitivity system”. Looking at the ONGO law from a more holistic viewpoint, the law 
seems to encourage this interpretation in more than one way. By mandating all ONGOs who 
register to tie themselves to a PSU or a Chinese partner, implementing facilitative measures to 
demand a minimum level of cooperation and open communication channels between them, as 
well as putting in force an extensive supervision system, the ONGOs would, in theory, be 
well equipped to keep themselves updated on how the politically discretionary parts of the 
law is to be interpreted at any point in time, or seek guidance if they are unsure.  
If the lawmakers intended to keep parts this system of political interpretation as a supplement 
to the regulation of ONGOs, can the system be considered legal in nature? In an attempt to 
answer this question, the more operational question would be to where the system places on 
the spectrum of rule of law. Using the traditional Western understanding of rule of law as a 
frame of reference, the answer would be a clear no. Looking to Horsley’s definition, the 
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system is not meant to act as a curb on state and private power, the rules are neither set in 
advance nor probable to be applied consistently, equally and transparently by independent 
courts to protect civil, political, and human rights.  
However, looking to Peerenboom’s definitions of a thick and thin model of rule of law, one 
could maybe draw some insight to the question. The system is “general”, in the sense that it 
applies to all ONGOs, as well as “public”, if considering that the vagueness of the legal text 
in the politically discretionary articles signals that knowledge about the current political 
situation is required to understand the interpretation of the terms used. Furthermore, assuming 
that the system of guidance, supervision and warnings function, the politically discretionary 
laws are “capable of being followed”, as well as “enforced”.  
Whether or not the laws meet the requirement of being “prospective”, “clear”, “consistent” 
and “stable” are more debatable. For a law to be “prospective”, it needs to, to a minimum, 
exist before it is enforced. If the majority of the interpretation of the law is under constant 
change and discretion of the authorities, it becomes very hard for the ONGOs to be aware of 
the law’s interpretation to guide their actions. On the other hand, again assuming that the that 
the guidance and warning system functions, the ONGOs could be able to know how the law is 
interpreted before carrying out activity that may be in breach of the regulations. The same 
applies to the law’s “clarity”, it should be clear to anyone reading the law that more 
information is needed to correctly interpret it, and such information could be obtained by 
using the guidance and warning system. Lastly, however, it would be an even longer stretch to 
characterize the laws to be “consistent” or “stable”, as they are under constant change and 
discretion of the authorities.  
Using Peerenboom’s definition of a thin rule of law to analyze the question of whether or not 
the interpretative system is legal or not does not give a clear answer, and could be explored in 
even greater detail. While meeting some of the requirements, one would have to stretch the 
term quite far to be able to answer yes to the question. However, considering the question is 
very useful to understand the authoritarian aspects of the ONGO law. Law works differently 
in China. Its system and logic is sometimes distinctively non-legal to Western scholars, yet 
considering that ONGOs in China had very limited regulation up until recently, ONGOs 
found ways to interpret and orient themselves in regards to its more authoritarian and quasi-







The ONGOs that operate in China all understand the risks involved to the point where it even 
might be hard to explain their strategies to people outside the Chinese system. Many ONGOs 
view compliance with the Chinese quasi-legal sensitivity policy and successfully working 
towards their operational goals as the same issue. Working with the government and having 
several contact persons in the right governmental branches can both provide networking 
opportunities, as well as advice about which whether or not a planned activity is going to be 
regarded as sensitive or not.  
In this context, whether or not an ONGOs activity is sanctioned by the state, is governed by 
both law and unwritten norms. With the introduction of the ONGO law in January 2017, this 
system has been formalized. The law sets up regulations about registration and a control 
regime, but leaves it up to Public Supervisory Units (PSU), who in many cases are 
governmental departments, to act as the day-to-day advisor and supervisor for each ONGO.  
Because of this the Chinese regulations appears legal in nature, but lacks sources that can be 
read and understood by a legal scholar in order to find what the rules really are. Some of the 
norms these ONGOs are adhering to are simply assumptions about what kind of behavior 
could lead to triggering the government into enforcing a rule they otherwise would have not 
enforced, or harassing and threatening Chinese partner organizations.  
The Chinese authoritarian legal environment also reduces the legal subjects’ access to 
independent courts. Although China has had the Administrative Procedural Law for several 
decades, which grants legal subjects the right to litigation against the government, as far as I 
am aware there has been no litigation brought against the government by an ONGO claiming 
breaches of their rights as organizations. A plausible explanation for this could be that the 
ONGOs don’t trust the Chinese courts, and that there has been very sparse amounts of legal 
rights to claim breached, but for many of the ONGOs such a confrontational way of solving 
their problems with the government would harm their ability to successfully reach their goals 
and alienate valuable government partners. Whether this will change with the implementation 
of the ONGO law is still unknown.  
As of today, the system remains one of permission, not rights. Although the ONGO law 
grants certain rights to registered ONGOs, at the moment it seems unlikely that these rights 
will be tested in courts, either by the unwillingness by the ONGOs to do so, or by the courts 
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restricting the ONGOs access to litigation. Before litigation is tested, whether or not such 
rights are applicable in the legal system remains speculative. Until then the ONGOs are likely 
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9. Appendix: Interview Guide 
 
Attention: Every interview point is applied to the situation before and after the ONGO-law 
took effect, except point 2 which is asking about the ONGO-law specifically. 
 
1. Please describe the history of the organization’s existence in China and its goals, 
funding, activities, partners, registration status, and main challenges.  
 
2. Please describe how your organization obtains its interpretation of the ONGO-law, 
which sources of information it uses to do so (i.e. state/other 
organizations/partners/media), which parts of the law appears more or less clear, and 
whether or not you think your organizations interpretation of the law is similar to the 
interpretation of other organizations.  
 
3. Please describe the organizations relationship to the state and the relationship’s effect 
on activities, including personal- and organization-level relationships.  
 
4. It is my understanding that a lot of NGOs try to avoid getting in trouble with the state 
by not stepping over the line of how to act in China. If the law is unclear about where 
the line is, the line is sometimes hidden within a grey area. Please describe the 
organization’s strategies to avoid getting in trouble, how you assess where the grey 
area begins and where the line is, which sources of information you use when 
assessing where the line is, and examples of risks of stepping over, or too close, to the 
line you have faced, or could face.   
 
5. Please describe the organization’s relationship to other organizations, and how these 
relationships affect your organization’s assessment of risk of stepping too close to the 
line.  
 
 
 
 
